

“Change of Command”

When?and
Where ?

Case Study

- **Name of Ship** :Korea Destiny
- **Registry** :Panama Registry
- **Built** :1997 Japan
- **GRT** 5,342 **NRT** 2,635 **Dwt** 8,765
- **Type of Ship**: Chemical Tanker
- **Akasaka Diesel Engine** 4,900 Bhp
- **Fitted also with a Bow thruster**
- **Two Radars (both 3cm) One is ARPA**
- **No Course recorder**
- **Service speed** 13.50 knots

Korea Destiny

- Registered Owners
- Ocean Hope Navigation S.A. Oita.Japan.
- Managers
- KK Ship Management Co.,Ltd.Japan
- 54 Ships
- General Manager is the Designated Person
- Master : Korean : Chief Officer Korean
- Total(19) all joined Ship on 6 December 2002

Crossing Situation Collision at Sea

- 17 December 2002
- While on a 035 Degree course heading for Sri Racha Esso Terminal in Thailand, **Korea Destiny** Collided with a Container ship **Pakistan Destiny** on a departure course of 260 degree after dropping Pilot at a Sriracha Port in Thailand.
- **Pakistan Destiny** was on the Starboard bow of the **Korea Destiny**.

Korea Destiny vs Pakistan Destiny

- Panama Flag State Casualty Inspector
- Captain Edwin Aye Tut. MNI and
- Individual Member of IFSMA since 1989
- Was assigned to the Panama Registry
- “ **Korea Destiny** ”Ship to investigate the casualty on behalf of the Flag Administration on 13 January 2003.
- Only from Industry Publications can the data of
- “ **Pakistan Destiny** ” can be collected.

Pakistan Destiny

- Built : 1991
- Flag: Singapore
- GRT 16,731 Net 8,317
- TEU capacity 1,334
- Registered Owners
- Gardenia Shipping Co.,(Pte)Ltd.Singapore.
- Operators: Universal Pacific Lines (Pte) Ltd.
- Singapore.
- Master: Pakistani Chief Officer : Pakistani

Korea Destiny

- Bound from Singapore on 12 December 2002 in loaded condition for discharging at Sri Racha, Thailand.
- Some or all cargoes are owned by Exxon Mobil.
- The Korean Master is to sign off at Thailand port on 18 December 2002 and the Chief Officer take over command. It is implicit in this arrangement that the Chief Officer was considered qualified and experienced enough to take over command of the Ship.
- A new Chief Officer will arrive on the 18 December 2002 in Thailand.

The Collision Korea Destiny and Pakistan Destiny

- Sea watch 0400 – 0800 Chief Officer 's watch
- Time of collision : **0447 hours local time 17 December 2002**
- There were no VTS radar coverage for this area so independent evidence concerning movement of the both ships will be available.
- “**Korea Destiny**” has no course recorder and the GPS does not have track save function.
- The only evidence of the “ **Korea Destiny** ” are the witness evidence.
- Stand by Engine on the “**Korea Destiny**” was at 0400 hours local time.

Events leading to the Investigation

- On 13 January 2003
- Captain Edwin Aye Tut drove to the Ship at a Shipyard where she was docking and repairing the collision damages, taking the DP a ride for the 120 km trip.
- I asked him about his Company and what had happened. He explained briefly, about the collision
- I asked the DP the nationality of his Master and Crew and replied that Master and Chief Officer are Koreans.
- I asked for the rest.. He could not answer.

Events leading to the Investigation

- I boarded the ship from the floating dock gangway and was greeted by the duty officer in a familiar tone and accent in English.
- I asked " Are you Myanmar ? " The answer was,
• " Yes Sir, we all are except the top four, who are Koreans"
- I walked passed some crew, who smiled and greeted me in silent manner.
- I am in common ground and my investigation will be quite helpful, I thank !!

Events Leading to the Investigation

- I was taken to the Master and Chief officer in the Officers' mess room.
- I introduced myself and not much was needed to explain as the Master and crew had known that I am coming that day.
- I showed my letter of appointment from the Panama Maritime Authority and asked for a crew list.
- I did some paper work as needed as per the 46 pages investigation guidelines of Res.A884(21) to make my findings, conclusions and recommendations.
- I asked some check list based on the ISM Code Safety Management System related with navigation. Found not properly done or blanks check lists from the date the Master and crew joined the ship.
- Asked the Master on the ISM Code Ship's Safety Manual, he seem not familiar with the manual.

Events leading to the Investigation

- To re enact the collision, I asked the Master and Chief Officer to take me to the Bridge. The DP and the Superintendents followed.
- I asked the Master for the damages just to change the subject as they all look quite nervous.
- Just as I was to ask the Chief Officer to recall the incident, The DP handed me their P&I Club Surveyor report copy, saying it will assist as a guidance to my investigation.
- I read the P&I Club surveyor's report made on the 18th. and 19th. of December 2002 immediately after the collision.
- Here are some events worthy to note to reflect my presentation " Change of command "when and where ?

Investigation leading to the Collision from the P&I report

Korea Destiny 17 December 2002
ETA Sri Racha Pilot Station 0530 .To anchor.
0400-0800 : Chief Officer in charge and AB at the manual helm on a northerly course. Reached preplanned alter course to starboard shortly after 0400 and Chief officer altered to course 035 degree
Visibility was 5 nautical miles
Master arrived on the Bridge after alter course to 035.

P&I report

- **"Korea Destiny"** Chief Officer first noticed the lights of the other ship on her starboard bow at distance of 5-6 nautical miles. And visually observed two white masthead lights (open) and a red sidelight about 30 degree on the starboard bow.
- From his APRA Radar, CPA gets the other ship's speed about 4 knots
- The Chief Officer considered that this target posed no threat at this time to the navigation of the **" Korea Destiny "** at about 0410-0415 hours

P&I Report

- The Master did not initially concern himself with the navigation of the vessel, leaving that in the hands of the Chief Officer. The Master prepared himself a cup of tea and observed what was going on around him.
- **" Korea Destiny "** proceeded with full maneuvering speed at about 12 knots.
- The Chief Officer was in charge of the Ship, with the Master drinking tea and the Myanmar Second Officer plotting the Ship's position.
- Chief Officer decided to call the other ship on the VHF and broadcast : " Departure Vessel on my Starboard bow, this is **"Korea Destiny"**, I am going to the anchorage, please go around my stern" (or similar words with the same meaning)
- He received a reply: **"Korea Destiny "**, this is **"Pakistan Destiny"**, I am going to Hong Kong."

P&I Report

- **" Korea Destiny "** continued towards the anchorage with unabated speed and unaltered course.
- The distances between the two ships decreased. The other Ship's speed has increased.
- **The Master was still not involving himself in the navigation or conning the ship, leaving those tasks in the hands of the Chief Officer, who was scheduled to relieve him on arrival in Thailand.**
- When the distance between the two ships decreased to less than 3 miles, Master first particularly became aware of the "Pakistan Destiny" when she flashed her Aldis signal lamp in the direction of the **" Korea Destiny "**

P&I Report

- The Chief Officer standing at the ARPA informed the Master that the other ship was a dangerous target. The Master ordered half ahead on the engine and told the Chief Officer to try and contact the other ship once more by VHF.
- The Chief Officer called again on Channel 16
- "Ship on my starboard side stay clear of my stern". There was no response from **"Pakistan Destiny"**, only several short flashes on the Aldis signaling lamp to which the Chief Officer responded similarly.

P&I Report

- Chief Officer could not recall the speed of the other ship **" Pakistan Destiny "** on his ARPA in the period leading up to the collision but had the impression that she is still increasing.
- Chief Officer continued monitoring the other ship on the Radar while the Master was observing the approaching ship through the Bridge windows.
- Neither of them observed any alteration of course of the other ship.

P&I Report The Collision

- Shortly before the collision the Master ordered stop engines followed by Hard a port on the rudder. Shortly after she began swinging, the Master ordered "Steady" and the helmsman steadied.
- Almost immediately steadied on her new heading, a collision took place between the bow of the "Pakistan Destiny" and the starboard side accommodation and hull of the "Korea Destiny"

P&I Report The Collision

- The helmsman estimated the course at the time of collision was about 030 degrees. Master estimated the speed about 9 or 10 knots. Witnesses on board "Korea Destiny" indicated that the two ships collided at almost 90 degrees with "Pakistan Destiny" leading slightly aft.
- A large impact was felt at the time of collision. It was reported that "Pakistan Destiny" rotated slightly to starboard before both ships cleared each other.
- Collision time recorded on the "Korea Destiny" was 04:47 local time.
- A VHF conversation after the collision indicated "Pakistan Destiny" had been steering a course of 260 degree at approximately 11 knots at the time of impact.
- Unofficially learnt that "Pakistan Destiny" engines were running astern before the collision.



Findings

- No local regulations that modify the provisions of the International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea.
- Rules applying to vessels in sight of one another
- On the evidence of "Korea Destiny" alone, it appears that this was a clear crossing situation with "Korea Destiny" the give-way vessel and the "Pakistan Destiny" the stand on vessel.
- "Pakistan Destiny" was the stand on vessel. She likewise had her own obligation under Rule 17 to take action to avoid collision.
- Such VHF conversations seeking to modify the collision regulations) must always be avoided.

Findings

- The "Korea Destiny" Chief Officer assumed that by requiring "Pakistan Destiny" to alter course to port to come around her stern and he could continue heading towards the anchorage with impunity. No confirmation from "Pakistan Destiny" that she would comply and carry out as the "Korea Destiny" Chief Officer asked to do.
- No extra look out
- No observance of ordinary practice of seamen.
- I thought, The Korean Master on the Bridge seem quite cool, drinking tea.

Findings

"Korean Destiny" lost several tons of heavy bunker fuel to the sea as a consequence of damage to an engine room side tank. Extensive damage to her accommodation including the Master's Cabin and Bunk ! Starboard side hull plating with flooding of the cargo pump room causing further damage to the pumps and electrical equipment.

Findings

- I asked the Korean Chief Officer to come up to the Bridge windows to tell me what happened that fateful morning.
- The Master suddenly approached and said in a firm voice, " Captain Tut, we would like to tell you the truth "
- It was my turn to look cool and I said:
- "Okay tell me..."

The Truth

- The Master was not on the Bridge until after the impact.
- He was sleeping in a portside spare cabin when the other ship's bow went into the starboard side Master's cabin bunk!
- The Chief Officer was in charge of the Bridge and only the Myanmar Second officer and the AB were on the Bridge.
- Second officer was plotting the Ships and reporting to the Chief Officer while the AB was at the manual helm to orders.
- No extra visual lookouts on watch.

The Truth.

- All the navigation, ship handling and technicalities as in the P&I report are true, except the Master was not the person carrying out or doing nor on the Bridge, until after impact that he rushed up to the Bridge.
- The Master and Chief Officer had changed command since 16", at sea and the Master had vacated his cabin to the new Command and he slept in the port side cabin, that eventually saved his life.
- Having taken over Command, the day before, the Chief Officer did not call the Master for approaches to anchor.
- The Master and Crew were not familiar with the ISM code manuals and check lists were also true...

More Truth to come.....

- The Designated Person continued to explain;
- The Master and Crew were not theirs!!
- Not under their KK Ship management Co., Ltd.
- The Ship was to handover to a new Management Company which the Master and crew belongs, Company and Document of Compliances to change on December 6,2002 when the crew changed.
- But charterers requested to them, KK Ship management, to continue until completed discharging at Sri Racha, Thailand.
- The Master brought their new ISM code manuals but did not implement them yet.
- Nor continue use the present Managers manuals fully when they joined ship on 6 December 2002

Finale

- The Korean Chief Officer did not become Master on this ship, lost his command and was discharged after the Dry Docking. His replacement was on board already at the time of my investigation.
- I met the Korean Master with his family in a Korean Restaurant in Bangkok three months later.
- He was arrested by the Thai Authorities for pollution but being Thailand, the land of smiles, he was allowed to stay in a hotel of his choice and not put in jail and allowed to even tour the country, except his travel documents were taken in custody and cannot leave the country until the case is cleared for him.
- So, he said he brought his family from Korea for their first visit to Thailand for a short holiday.
- He said to me " Captain Tut, next time I know when to change command and where to change command. Am lucky, I did not die that morning in my bunk. "
- " It will shame my family name."



Similar Crossing Collision



Crossing Collision



"Curse of The Pequot" Or Daylight Blindness?

- The Date: November 6, 2005
- The Time: 1745 Hours
- The Place: Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela.


M.V.Maersk Holyhead In Better Days



- We are now looking through the bridge windows of Liberian registered 70,165 dwt panamax bulk carrier M/V Pequot



Collision Alarm!
Brace! Brace!



Aftermath -- At Anchor



Curse of The PEQUOT

"Curse of The Pequot"?



Human Error

What tanker claims are most affected by human error?

Source: Bureau of Maritime Transport & Security, 2007-2008



Are the causes related to manning?
 Number/Experience/Training

