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I F S M A - NEWSLETTER

The International Shipmasters Link

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**IFSMA Register of Technical Consultants and Maritime Experts
(RTCME) now Available on the Internet at "www.ifsma.org"**

**The 28th IFSMA Annual General Assembly will be held in Vladivostok, Russia
on Friday 31st May and Saturday 1st June 2002.**

STCW White List Expanded

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as amended.

Parties to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as amended, confirmed by the Maritime Safety Committee to have communicated information which demonstrates that full and complete effect is given to the relevant provisions of the Convention.

1 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its seventy-fourth session (30 May to 8 June 2001), received reports by the Secretary-General pursuant to regulation I/7, paragraph 2 of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended, (STCW Convention). The reports were in respect of those STCW Parties whose information had not been fully evaluated in time for the seventy-third session of the Committee (27 November to 6 December 2000). The list of STCW Parties confirmed at that session of the Committee to have communicated information, which had demonstrated that full and complete effect was given to the relevant provisions of the Convention, was promulgated as MSC/Circ.978.

2 MSC 74 noted that, in preparing the reports required by STCW regulation I/7, paragraph 2, the Secretary-General had solicited and taken into account the views of the competent persons selected from the list established pursuant to paragraph 5 of section AI/7 of the STCW Code and circulated as MSC/Circ. 797, as revised from time to time.

3 In accordance with STCW regulation I/7, paragraph 3, MSC 74 confirmed further STCW Parties, additional to those listed in MSC/Circ 978, which had com-

municated information demonstrating that they give full and complete effect to the relevant provisions of the STCW Convention. **The list at annex contains those STCW Parties confirmed by the Committee at both its seventy-third and seventy-fourth sessions.** The Committee noted that, as the process of communicating and evaluating information is continuing, further Parties may be added to the list at annex at its subsequent meetings.

4 The Committee draws the attention of maritime administrations, shipowners ship operators and managers, ship masters and other parties concerned to the following:

.1 not all of the STCW Parties listed at annex provide seafarer training, and some of those Parties listed may only provide a limited range of training; and

.2 the fact that a Party is listed in the annex does not relieve those concerned of their obligations under the STCW Convention.

5 Notwithstanding the Committee's identification of the Parties listed at annex, Member Governments are invited to draw the attention of their port State control officers to the guidance contained in MSC/Circ.918 including the fact that valid certificates of competency and endorsements issued or recognised by a Party in accordance with the relevant provisions of the STCW Convention, which were in force immediately prior to 1 February 1997, remain valid until 1 February 2002, subject to STCW regulation I/15.

6 As Parties are entitled to accept, in principle, certificates issued by or on behalf of Parties identified in the list at annex, and a position on that list is one of the necessary measures used by many Administrations for the issue of endorsements in compliance with STCW regula-

tion I/10, the attention of port State control officers is drawn to the fact that this circular was issued on 8 June 2001 and, therefore, for practical reasons, seafarers should not be expected to hold certificates with such endorsements until 1 February 2002.

ANNEX

Parties to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as amended, confirmed by the Maritime Safety Committee to have communicated information which demonstrates that full and complete effect is given to the relevant provisions of the Convention.

Algeria	Islamic Republic of Iran	Singapore
Antigua and Barbuda	Italy	Slovenia
Argentina	Israel	Solomon Islands
Australia	Jamaica	South Africa
Azerbaijan	Japan	Spain
Bahamas	Kiribati	Sri Lanka
Bangladesh	Latvia	Sweden
Barbados	Liberia	Switzerland
Belgium	Lithuania	Thailand
Brazil	Luxembourg	Tonga
Bulgaria	Malaysia	Trinidad & Tobago
Canada	Maldives	Tunisia
Chile	Malta	Turkey
China	Marshall Islands	Tuvalu
Colombia	Mauritius	Ukraine
Cote d'Ivoire	México	United Kingdom**
Croatia	Micronesia (Federated	United States
Cuba	States of)	Uruguay
Cyprus	Morocco	Vanuatu
Czech Republic	Myanmar	Venezuela
Denmark*	Netherlands	Viet Nam
Ecuador	New Zealand	Yugoslavia
Egypt	Norway	China (Hong Kong SAR)***
Estonia	Pakistan	
Fiji	Panama	* Includes: Faeroe Islands
Finland	Papua New Guinea	
France	Peru	** Includes: Isle of Man
Georgia	Philippines	Bermuda
Germany	Poland	Cayman Islands
Ghana	Portugal	Gibraltar
Greece	Republic of Korea	
Honduras	Romania	*** Associate Member
Hungary	Russian Federation	
Iceland	Saint Vincent and the	
India	Grenadines	
Indonesia	Samoa	MSC/Circ.996 8 June 2001.
Ireland	Senegal	

2nd International Symposium on Human Factors on Board

Safe Navigation in the 21st Century – A Holistic Approach towards Operators' Requirements on Technology, Operation and Personnel – 19-21 September 2001, Bremen, Germany.

About the Conference

By investigating major maritime, air and road accidents it becomes evident, that in most cases the disastrous combination of events was caused by a chain of human errors. In the majority of these cases the performance of the human operator failed due to one or more of the following circumstances: poor design of equipment and workplace, inadequate communicative structures, effects of workload, stress and fatigue, insufficient training, etc. ISHFOB '01 is intended to provide answers to the future requirements on the operators' position by applying a holistic approach, taking into account all technological, operational and personnel aspects, but also legal and administrative issues.

Besides paper and poster presentations by experts from all over the world, having experience with all kinds of different transportation systems, a technical exhibition will be arranged in order to provide a range of information on the scope of the conference as diversified as possible to the delegates of this special meeting.

ISHFOB '01 will offer a good opportunity and a useful forum for discussion and interchange of information between designers, builders, owners and operators of ships, naval architects, pilots, sailing mariners and marine engineers, maritime administrators, lawyers and consultants, maritime educators and trainers, staff from supply industry, marine insurance companies, classification societies and maritime supervisory authorities, the scientific and academic communities and all others with a common interest in human factors on board.

For contact details and links for further information please see below and the card enclosed with this issue of the IFSMA Newsletter.

Email: dgon.bonn@t-online.de

Web Site: www.dgon.de

What is a Harbour Master

A 'Harbour Master' is defined in the International Harbour Masters' Association (IHMA) Constitution as:

"The person who, whatever may be his local title of office, is the principal person who normally exercises jurisdiction at a place, and in ways, that meet the following criteria:

- The jurisdiction is exercised over the water area of a port or port approach
- In the exercise of the jurisdiction he should possess an authority conferred on him by national law, regulation, or rules
- The duties should encompass a legal and/or operational responsibility for the movement of shipping, and
- The duties should involve him significantly in ensuring that shipping movements are within the area of his jurisdiction are carried out safely."

Title may vary according to national or local style and currently (but not exclusively) includes:

Harbour Master
 Port Captain
 Commandant du Port
 Hafenmeister
 Havnefoged
 Port Master
 Master Attendant
 Capitaine de Port
 Manager – Marine Operations
 Maritime Director
 Capitaine du Port
 Director Nautical Affairs
 Port Operations Manager
 Capitano di Porto
 Port Commander
 Maritime Co-ordinator
 Capitao do Porto
 Head of Terminal
 Principal Marine Officer
 Traffic Manager

IHMA was formed in June 1996 with more than 250 Members in 52 Countries worldwide. At its 84th Session in June 2000 the IMO Council granted Consultative Status to IHMA and IFSMA welcomes the Harbour Masters to the Back Benches of IMO.

Types of Modern oil Tanker

Panamax Tankers




Typical Double Hull Ship of 60,000 Dwt. LOA 228.6 m, Breadth 32.2m, Draft 12.6m- Lightship: 11,000 tons of steel

Ships in the 55-70,000 dwt size range, 70,000 dwt being the maximum size tanker able to transit the Panama Canal. The need to

pass through a series of Canal locks dictates a maximum length of 274.3 metres and maximum breadth of 32.3 metres. In the Atlantic Basin trades Panamax vessels have a competitive advantage over large tankers due to physical trading and local port depth restrictions. North American imports of crude and fuel oil comprise the bulk of Panamax tanker business.

Aframax Tankers




Typical Double Hull Ship of 100,000 Dwt. LOA 253m, Breadth 44.2m, Draft 11.6m- Lightship: 14,850 tons of steel

Tankers in the 75-120,000 dwt size range. AFRA is Average Freight Rate Assessment. At one

time Aframax was used to refer to ships up to 79,999 dwt, the upper limit of one of six deadweight groups for which the AFRA rate is assessed. Aframax ships are traditionally employed on a wide variety of short and medium-haul crude oil trades. The biggest tanker that can be accommodated fully laden in the ports of the US – the world's largest importer of oil – is 100,000 dwt, and this only at a limited number of ports. Many of the more modern ships in the Aframax size range are built as long-haul product tankers, with epoxy-coated tanks.

Suezmax Tankers




Typical Double Hull Ship of 150,000 Dwt. LOA 274m, Breadth 50m, Draft 14.5m- Lightship: 20,000 tons of steel

Suezmax tankers are ships in the 120,000-200,000 dwt size range and

are generally identified as those capable of lifting one million barrel cargoes. The name was originally bestowed on such ships because from 1980, when a development project which deepened the waterway to 16.1 metres was completed, the largest tankers able to transit the Suez Canal fully laden were those of 140,000-150,000 dwt. This association will effectively become redundant in year 2001 when a project to deepen the Canal to 18.9 metres is completed. The Canal may be further deepened to 20.1 metres by 2005 and 22.0 metres by 2010.


Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs)



Typical Double Hull Ship of 280,000 Dwt. LOA 335m, Breadth 57m, Draft 21m- Lightship: 35,000 tons of steel

VLCCs are tankers in the 200,000-320,000 dwt size range. Ships of this size were prompted by the rapid growth in global oil consumption during the 1960's and, in 1967, closure of the Suez Canal, necessitating voyages around the Cape of Good Hope. Today, VLCCs are the most effective way of transporting large volumes of oil, including 2-million barrel cargoes, to customers over relatively long distances. Relatively simple ships, VLCCs are subdivided into a number of cargo tanks by two longitudinal and several transverse bulkheads.

Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs)



Typical Double Hull Ship of 410,000 Dwt. LOA 377 m,
Breadth 68m, Draft 23m- Lightship: 45,000 tons of steel


Tankers in excess of 32,000 dwt. Most ships of this type were built in the mid to late 1970s and are now approaching 25 years of age. Ordered to take advantage of the economies of scale in a buoyant market, they were delivered as oil prices skyrocketed and demand collapsed. There are now under 40 of these ships remaining. Rather inflexible and limited to serving a few deepwater ports, ULCCs never achieved their full potential. In early 2000 a tanker owner ordered two 440,000 dwt ULCCs, with 2 options, the first ULCC ordered in 20 years.

With acknowledgement to the Tanker Newsletter.

Did you Know? Making a Temporary Eye with Bulldog Grips

A temporary eye, either soft or thimble, can be made in wire rope by using bulldog grips, which are screwed clamps holding the two parts of the rope together. ***It is most important that the grips should be fitted with the U-bolt over the tail end of the rope and the bridge on the standing part,*** as shown in the figure.

Fig.



Bulldog grips are supplied in various sizes to fit each size of rope. Should the correct grip for a certain rope not be available the next largest size should be used. Three grips should be used on all ropes up to three inches in circumference, four grips on ropes over three inches and up to four inches in circumference, and five grips or more on ropes of over four inches circumference. Their spacing should be about three times the circumference of the rope. Grips are apt to mark or crush the rope, and both grips and rope should be frequently inspected for security and wear. Grips should not be used to join two wire ropes together.

The World VTS Guide

The IALA IAPH IMPA World VTS Guide has been designed to give Masters of Ships, navigators and interested persons, clear and concise diagrammatic and written information regarding the navigational requirements of the VTS Centres of the World. Particular attention has been paid to communications requirements.

VTS systems operated by participating authorities are described in near uniform format. Associated services are also described but only so far as they concern communications and procedural requirements.

The pages of the IALA IAPH IMPA World VTS Guide are available on the World Wide Web at:

<http://www.worldvtsguide.org>.

A brochure is included with this edition of the Newsletter further describing this service and providing full contact details for each of the three joint issuers.

Bulk Carrier Casualty Report

From the INTERCARGO annual report for year 2000

Executive Summary

Fourteen ships and twenty three lives were lost during the year 2000, although these figures do not take into account losses from bulk carriers of less than 10,000 dwt of which at least ten were reported as lost. The previous ten-year totals now amount to one hundred and thirty four ships and seven hundred and forty lives lost. At just over twenty years, the average age of the bulk carriers lost during 2000 again was significantly higher than the average age of the world fleet.

Notable losses in 2000 included the *Leader L*, which sank as a result of structural failure with the loss of eighteen lives, and which precipitated the expulsion of the classification society Polski Regestr Statkow (PRS) from IACS. The *Treasure*, another sinking as a result of structural failure, went down off the South African coast after being denied a port of refuge. It caused heavy pollution from the bunker fuel it had on board. Bad weather drove three ships ashore. In September the *Bintang Biru* sank in typhoon conditions off Korea, and right at the end of the year the *John-R* ran aground on the Norwegian coast and the *Coral Bulker* dragged her anchor while waiting for port clearance and became fast on the breakwater. One company, Ilias Shipping, had the misfortune to lose two ships, the *Eurobulker IV* and *Eurobulker X* and both in Mediterranean waters.

Analysis of the losses that occurred over the ten-year period show a general level of consistency in the average age and annual total deadweight (dwt) of the ships lost. This is despite the introduction of the Enhanced Survey Programme in 1996 (earlier by class) and the amendments to SOLAS Chapter VI and the introduction of the code of practice for the safe loading and unloading of bulk carriers (BLU Code) in 1998. Bulk carriers continue to suffer a similar number of losses to tankers. Structural failure remains both a consistent and significant cause of loss, while the presence of heavy cargoes feature in many of those losses.

Loss of Life over last ten years

1991	186
1992	30
1993	78
1994	106
1995	57
1996	50
1997	80
1998	87
1999	43
2000	23

Loss of Bulk Carriers for each year over last ten years (those caused by structural failure indicated in brackets).

1991	22	(10)
1992	13	(2)
1993	8	(2)
1994	14	(3)
1995	5	(2)
1996	14	(2)
1997	11	(0)
1998	19	(3)
1999	14	(2)
2000	14	(3)

Some Comments from Roger Clipsham on the JCA Script for “Safe navigation in Restricted Water – Shallow Water Effect”.

What exactly is “SHIP SQUAT”?

This term has not been mentioned in the JCA Script: In 1978 Dr. C.B. Barrass answered this question as follows: “When a ship proceeds through water, she pushes water ahead of her. In order not to leave a “hole” in the water, this volume of water pushed ahead of the ship must return down the sides and under the keel of the ship. The streamlines of return flow are speeded up under the ship. This causes a drop in pressure, resulting in the ship dropping vertically in the water. As well as dropping vertically the ship trims forward or aft. The overall decrease in the underkeel clearance forward or aft is called “SHIP SQUAT.”

What are the Signs that Ship has entered Shallow Water Conditions?

In 1978 Dr. C.B. Barrass stated that these could be (a) increased wave-making at the forward end of the ship, (b) ship becomes more sluggish to manoeuvre, (c) changes in end drafts as shown by Draft Indicators or Echo Sounder traces on the bridge, (d) a decrease in Engine Revolutions a 15% drop in Service RPM open sea and

20% drop in Service RPM confined channel not unusual, (e) a drop in ship speed which could amount to 30% in open water and to 60% in a confined channel, (f) the ship may start to vibrate suddenly because of the entrained water effect causing the natural hull frequency to become resonant with another frequency.

What Three Statements reflect the New Insight into SHIP SQUAT?

In 1990 Bruno Ortlepp considered that the following three statements were necessary. (a) A body in a liquid is acted upon by two distinct sets of pressure. The *hydrostatic* pressure at a point is that due to the weight of the liquid above it. Hydrostatic pressures integrated over the body surface is the buoyancy force. This is found via Archimedes’ Principle which equates it to the weight of the displaced liquid. (b). The *hydrodynamic* pressure at a point arises from the velocity of the liquid past that point. The dynamic forces are much more difficult to predict; there is no equivalent to Archimedes. It requires laboratory experiments with physical models and elaborate theoretical (computer) calculations. (c) Once the body is in motion the *hydrostatic* pressures change due to the body (ship) carrying along her own depression in the liquid, into which the floating and speeding body has to sink in order to keep displacing its own weight in the liquid. In addition *hydrodynamic* forces appear and together they cause the phenomenon, an overall decrease in the underkeel clearance known as **SHIP SQUAT**.

What are the Combined effects of Hydrodynamic Interaction and Shallow Water?

In 1980 Merchant Shipping Notice (M930) the Marine Division of the then Department of Trade defined *shallow water as a depth of water less than about twice the draft* and reached the following conclusions. (a) The effects of interaction (and also of bank suction and rejection) are amplified in shallow water. (b) The effec-

tiveness of the rudder is reduced in shallow water, and depends very much on adequate propeller speed. The minimum revolutions needed to maintain steerage way may therefore be higher than are required in deep water. (c) Relatively high speeds in very shallow water must be avoided due to the danger of **grounding because of Squat**. An increase in draft of well over 10% has been observed at speeds of about 10 knots, but when speed is reduced Squat rapidly diminishes. It has also been found that **additional Squat due to interaction can occur when two ships are passing each other**. (d) The transverse thrust of the propeller changes in strength and may even act in the reverse sense to normal. (e) Ships may therefore experience quite marked changes in their manoeuvring characteristics as the depth of water under the keel changes. In particular when under keel clearance is very small a marked loss of turning ability is likely.

Draft Guidelines On Abandonment, Personal Injury And Death Of Seafarers Developed By IMO/ILO Working Group.

In a move aimed at improving the working conditions and ensuring the basic human rights of seafarers, States are to be formally urged to require shipowners to provide adequate financial security to cover claims from seafarers in cases of abandonment, personal injury and death. Two new draft resolutions and associated Guidelines were finalised by a joint International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International Labour Organisation (ILO) Working Group on Friday 4 May, marking the successful completion of an initiative that began following submissions to the IMO Legal Committee and the ILO Governing Body during 1998 and 1999.

The resolutions and Guidelines address the fact that, although there are interna-

tional instruments covering certain aspects of the problems relating to abandonment, death and personal injury of seafarers, some are not widely implemented and none deals with these problems comprehensively.

As a result, seafarers who have been abandoned in foreign ports often suffer severe hardships, including lack of food, medical care, and other necessities of life, as well as delays in their repatriation, while the claims to compensation of seafarers or their families in respect of injury or death are sometimes subject to delay. There is also a perception that, in some cases, there has been pressure to reduce the amount of claims in return for an expedited settlement.

Financial security in cases of abandonment of seafarers

The draft resolution on provision of financial security in case of abandonment of seafarers states that abandonment of seafarers is a serious problem involving a human and social dimension and recognises that, given the global nature of the shipping industry, seafarers need special protection.

The concern is that, if shipowners do not have adequate financial security, seafarers may not receive due remuneration or be promptly repatriated in cases of abandonment. The draft resolution affirms that provision for repatriation, maintenance while abandoned and payment of remuneration should form part of the seafarer's contractual and/or statutory rights and are not affected by the failure or inability of the shipowner to perform its obligations.

It also recognises that, in cases where the shipowner fails to perform, flag States and, in some cases, the State of nationality of the seafarer or the port State may be called upon to intervene.

The draft Guidelines say that shipowners should provide a financial security system that provides for the expenses of the repatriation to be met without cost to the seafarer, and for the maintenance of the seafarers from the time of abandonment to the time of arrival at the place of repatriation. The payment of all outstanding remuneration and contractual entitlements should be covered, as well as the payment of other expenses incurred by the seafarer during the period of abandonment arising from the abandonment.

They add that, should the shipowner fail to fulfil its responsibilities, the financial security system should provide for repatriation of the seafarer by appropriate and expeditious means, normally by air, and including provision for food and accommodation of the seafarer from leaving the ship until arrival at the place of repatriation, medical care, passage and transport of personal effects and any other reasonable charges.

The financial security system may take the form of a social security scheme, insurance, a national fund, or other forms of financial security. It should provide a right of direct access by the seafarer to the financial security, and apply regardless of the nationality of the seafarer.

The guidelines also state that shipowners should ensure that their seagoing ships engaged on international voyages have on board a certificate attesting to the existence of a financial security system in the event of abandonment of seafarers, which should be posted in a prominent position in the seafarers' accommodation. Shipowners should also display on board contact details of the persons or entity responsible for handling claims covered by the Guidelines.

Personal injury to or death of seafarers

The draft resolution on claims for personal injury to or death of seafarers notes a need

to recommend minimum international standards for the responsibilities of shipowners in respect of contractual claims in such cases. The draft resolution expresses the concern that, if shipowners do not have effective insurance cover, or other form of financial security, seafarers are unlikely to obtain full and prompt compensation. It states that putting in place effective arrangements for the payment of compensation is part of the shipowners' responsibilities to provide safe and decent working conditions.

The draft guidelines give definitions for contractual claims, effective insurance and so on, and set out shipowners' responsibilities to arrange for effective insurance cover with the aim of ensuring that seafarers receive prompt and full payment of their claims. They also recommend ships should carry a certificate issued by the insurer attesting to coverage for personal injury and death.

The Guidelines include a model receipt and release form which would be signed by the seafarer or heir or dependent and which would acknowledge receipt of a sum in satisfaction of the employer's obligation to pay contractual compensation for personal injury and/or death. But, importantly, the form would state that payment is to be made without admission of liability on the part of the shipowner and without prejudice to the seafarer's right to pursue any claim at law in respect of negligence, tort or any other legal redress available and arising out of the incident.

Next Step

The resolutions and their associated Guidelines ("Guidelines on Shipowners' Responsibilities in Respect of Contractual Clauses for Personal Injury to or Death of Seafarers" and "Guidelines on provision of Financial Security in case of Abandonment of Seafarers") will now be presented to the IMO Legal Committee in October

this year for approval and to the 22nd IMO Assembly in November for adoption. They will also be presented to the ILO Governing Body in November 2001 for adoption by that body. Once adopted, they will come into force on 1 January 2002.

The ILO's overriding goal is to promote opportunities for all men and women to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity. A number of ILO instruments contain clauses relating to conditions of work on board ships and the rights and duties of shipping employers and employees. IFSMA was admitted to the ILO's Special List of Non-Governmental International Organizations in February 1993 and has Consultative Status with the ILO.

Appointment of New ISMA Executive VP

Alan Ward has been appointed Executive Vice-President of the International Ship Managers' Association (ISMA). Announcing this appointment Peter Cremers, President of ISMA said, "Mr. Alan Ward, currently Head of Quality, Safety and Environmental aspects for Hanseatic Shipping Company, has been appointed Executive Vice President of ISMA. This will be a permanent position and Mr. Ward brings with him a wealth of experience, in particular as far as the ISMA Code is concerned. Alan has been deeply involved in the creation of the ISMA code, right from day one."

Mr. Cremers further explained: "The ISMA Committee felt the need was there for a full time, professional manager, well versed in shipping issues, who could represent ISMA to the industry at large on a regular, daily basis.

As such, Alan Ward's responsibilities will include the marketing of ISMA, the representation of ISMA at industry and Gov-

ernment level and to increase ISMA's public profile.

With the introduction of our new, upgraded Quality Code and ISMA's co-operation with EQUASIS, Alan will be busy from day one. We look forward to a strong year of growth for ISMA in 2001."

Alan commenced his career with the Blue Funnel Line in 1956, after education in industrial business and commercial management, including quality control theory and practices. He has further been involved in civil engineering project management associated with ports and harbour building and upgrading, before finally returning to international shipping, both at sea and shore. He has been involved, as a Chief engineer, in container shipping, gas, oil and chemical tankers, as well as dry bulk trades with companies in the UK, Australia, Cyprus and Kuwait, where he worked as General Superintendent for Kuwait Oil Tankers until the Iraqi invasion.

For the last 10 years he has been responsible for the development and management of the Quality, Safety and Environmental aspects for the Hanseatic Shipping Company based in Cyprus.

Mr Ward has relocated to the UK and is currently based at ISMA's office in the City of London.

Expanding on his new responsibilities Mr Ward explained that his key tasks include overseeing the introduction of the revised Code. The ISMA Code is written specifically for the shipping industry, unlike the ISO quality standards. It is more comprehensive than the ISM Code, as it covers broader business applications.

Explaining the new Code Mr Ward said "We wanted to change the emphasis from simple pollution prevention to the wider environmental management.

Our revisions give guidance for environmental management in the maritime sector and therefore aim to complement ISO 14001. We believe the ISMA Code meets all international standards and that therefore other quality standards are unnecessary for owners and managers”.

The other main aspect of the ISMA Code revision is to place greater emphasis on customer satisfaction. This means ensuring that throughout a ship management company’s organisation everyone is aware of the client’s needs and expectations. people directly implementing contracts must be aware of what the client’s expectations are.

Speaking of the new Code Mr Ward said, “Existing members have a transition period of 12 months to implement the revisions. They will be re-audited to the new Code as their audits come up after January 2002.”

Lifeboat Davits - Wire Rope Falls

It seems that no clear and explicit instructions have yet been issued as to the correct action to be taken regarding the former UK (DOT) requirement that lifeboat fall wires should be reversed after two years and renewed after four years in those vessels where the lifeboat davits are equipped with a **single length of wire rope fall** . The accompanying Maintenance Manual simply quotes the SOLAS requirement **without telling the ship’s personnel how to do it !**


SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 19/4 Maintenance of Falls states that “Falls used in launching shall be turned end for end at intervals of not more than 30 months and be renewed when necessary due to deterioration of the falls or at intervals of not more than five years, whichever is the earlier.”

Our friendly Company Marine Superintendent (now long since retired) tells us that the UK(DOT) issued the following **Instructions for the Guidance of Surveyors** which we quote hereunder:


“Wire rope falls should, as a general rule, be reversed after two years in service and renewed after a further two years, giving a total life span of four years. If, on removal from the davits for reversal after two years service, those parts of the falls that have been exposed to the weather are found to have deteriorated to an extent likely to affect their strength the surveyor should not permit reversal, and should require the falls to be renewed. **Stainless Steel Falls** should, as a general rule, be reversed every two years when they should be inspected for mechanical damage and other possible defects.

Where davits, which employ a single length of wire rope fall, middled between the davits with the two ends attached to the winch, are fitted, reversal can be achieved by cutting the fall at the centre of its length and splicing the ends which were originally on the winch barrels with thimbles to form eyes. The eyes can then be joined with a suitable shackle and the pin fitted with a satisfactory locking ar-

Before End for End



After End for End



rangement. Compliance with the Rules is required in respect of the splice connection and surveyors should be satisfied with the components used.”

In a *Technical Memorandum to the Fleet in 1977* the Marine Superintendent elaborated further:

“Since the shackle joining the two thimble eyes must have a proof load at least 2.1/2 times the SWL of the lifeboat fall wires it can be readily appreciated that such a shackle could be unduly large and cumbersome. For this reason, we suggest that the shackle be dispensed with by simply interlocking the two thimbles before splicing in the two ends which were originally on the winch barrels.”

Lifeboat Davit Manufacturers must ensure that their Maintenance Manuals are customised for the ACTUAL Installation fitted onboard ship ! Shipmasters - are YOU satisfied with your Maintenance Manual ?

“Places of Refuge” a priority issue for IMO

Maritime Safety Committee 30 May - 8 June 2001 MSC 74

IMO’s Member Governments have pledged to tackle the issue of providing places of refuge to vessels in distress as a matter of priority.

The decision by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to look at the problem comes in the wake of the incident earlier this year in which the salvors of the fully-laden tanker **Castor** were unable to find a sheltered place to effect cargo transfer and repairs for some 35 days. The incident sparked a great deal of concern about the provision of refuge for ships in distress.

Work on “places of refuge” to begin in July

The MSC agreed to instruct the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV) to begin considering the issue of places of refuge at its 47th session in July 2001.

Over the next two years, the NAV Sub-Committee is expected to work in co-operation with the Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications, Search and Rescue (COMSAR) and the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE) with a view to developing guidelines to help States and Masters deal with a situation in which a ship in distress seeks a place of refuge. The proposed guidelines might cover the following aspects:

1. action expected from coastal States providing “places of refuge” to ships in distress;
2. the evaluation of risks associated with the provision of places of refuge; and
3. action Masters of ships in distress should take when in need of “places of refuge” (including action on board and action required by other ships in their vicinity, salvage operators and coastal States).

The issue of places of refuge was highlighted as one of many issues for further action in the wake of the **Erika** incident in December 1999, but it was the **Castor** incident this year which brought the issue to the fore.

The **Castor** had sustained considerable structural damage in heavy weather and was deemed to present a serious risk of pollution and explosion. At the time, IMO Secretary-General William O’Neil called for a comprehensive review of the whole question of providing shelter for stricken vessels, suggesting that, in the interests of safety of life and environmental protection, coastal States should review their

contingency arrangements so that disabled ships could be provided with assistance and facilities appropriate to the circumstances.

Welcoming the MSC decision to move forward on the issue, Mr O'Neil said that while there were political and technical connotations surrounding the sovereignty aspects of the issue, these should not hamper the progress that IMO should make in providing suitable answers to a global problem.

"Taking into account the non-mandatory character of the approach envisaged by IMO, I am confident that any concern can be alleviated and that the matter will be tackled in IMO's usual successful manner to the benefit of safety of life at sea and environmental protection," Mr O'Neil said.

During the MSC debate on the issue, delegates raised the following main points for action at present and for future consideration:

- there was overwhelming support that the paramount concern in any action required relevant to the issue should be the safety of those involved;
- the protection of the marine environment should also be given high priority;
- there were legal issues (i.e. provisions of international law, in particular those of UNCLOS) which should be observed;
- sovereignty issues could not be ignored and jurisdiction rights of the coastal States concerned should also be taken into account;
- regional parameters/peculiarities might necessitate tackling ships-in-distress incidents on a case-by-case basis;
- common inter-regional approaches might not be feasible given differing weather and other conditions, including coast configuration;
- regional approaches might have positive and negative aspects;
- the suitability of coastal areas might play a decisive role in a State's decision to designate or not "places of refuge";
- the decision of coastal State to provide "place of refuge" facilities would be influenced by a risk assessment study of the situation;
- certain criteria and relevant guidelines should be established to enable coastal states to decide on the designation of "places of refuge" and the facilities which should go with them;
- coastal States should be provided with appropriate guidelines to assist them in their decision-making process and relevant operations;
- shipmasters, salvors and others involved in disabled ships' operations could benefit from appropriate operational guidelines;
- consideration should be given to neighbouring coastal states co-operating in relevant emergency situations; as well as to the involvement of SAR services at the national and/or regional level;
- the financial aspect of the issue should be borne in mind and liability and compensation issues should also be considered, etc.

The MSC noted that the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) had already discussed the issue and agreed to also bring the issue to the attention of the Legal Committee for consideration of any

matters relating to international law, jurisdiction, rights of coastal States, liability, insurance, bonds, etc. points of view.

The Committee also noted that, at a later stage and based on information by Member States, the Organisation might consider preparing a "World Guide of places of refuge" for use by shipmasters, salvage operators and others in case of ships in distress and in need of such places.

Dramatic Increase in Piracy and Armed Robbery

IMO meeting encourages regional agreements on anti-piracy measures

Maritime Safety Committee 30 May - 8 June 2001 MSC 74

The number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported to the IMO during 2000 was up by more than 50 per cent over the equivalent figure for 1999, the Organisation's Maritime Safety Committee was told last week.

The Committee noted with concern that the number of incidents had risen to 471, representing an increase of 162 in number or 52 percentage points over the figure for 1999; and that the total number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported to have occurred from 1984 to the end of May 2001, was 2,309. Although the Committee welcomed the information that, during the period 31 March 2000 to 31 March 2001, the number of incidents reported had decreased from 4 to 2 in the Mediterranean Sea and from 36 to 33 in West Africa, it was deeply concerned to note that, over the same period, the number of incidents reported had increased from 37 to 112 in the Malacca Strait, from 136 to 140 in the South China Sea, from 51 to 109 in the Indian Ocean, from 16 to 29 in East Africa and from 29 to 41 in South America and the Caribbean over the 1999 figures.

Most of the attacks worldwide were reported to have occurred in coastal States' concerned territorial waters while the ships were at anchor or berthed. The Committee was extremely concerned that, during the same period, the crews of the ships involved in the reported incidents had been violently attacked by groups of five to ten persons carrying knives or guns as a result of which seventy-two crew members had been killed, one hundred and twenty-nine had been wounded and five had been reported missing; and that, in addition, one ship had been destroyed, two ships had been hijacked, three ships had gone missing and on three occasions the attackers had used explosive devices.

The Committee recognised that the maritime community could no longer tolerate this situation and the serious repercussions it has on the safety of passengers and crews and therefore, once again, invited all Governments (of flag, port and coastal States) and the industry to intensify their efforts to eradicate these unlawful acts.

The delegation of the Philippines noted that the statistics on piracy had greatly assisted in focusing on areas where greater co-ordination was needed in the campaign against piracy, and cited the assistance of the International Maritime Bureau in sending quickly information to the Philippine Coast Guard regarding the pirate attack on the ship *Inabukwa* that led to the speedy recovery of the ship and the apprehension of the pirates. They, therefore, urged that similar measures be taken to inform concerned police authorities on pirate attacks, since the intent to commit piracy always originated ashore and, therefore, the coastal State concerned would have the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute this crime. In pursuing the proposal for a regional agreement, coastal States should have the appropriate piracy legislation, including national laws, in place to enable

the full exercise of the sovereign right of States to prosecute crime occurring within their shores or territory.

The Committee approved a draft Assembly resolution on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships for submission to the twenty-second session of the Assembly in November of this year, for adoption.

The Tragedy of the Captain Ilnitsky.

A Letter from Captain Petr Osichansky, President, FESMA, Vladivostok.

On the 28th of May 2001 I visited France just after the 27th General Assembly IFSMA was finished. The purpose of my visit was the meeting with the Captain Vladimir Ilnitsky. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Now he is serving his sentence in prison at 200 kilometres distance to the south-east of Paris. Our meeting was lasting for over three hours and it was pleasant for me to see that he was glad to use opportunity of speaking his native language. The last one who saw him at prison in 1997 was his son. At present he became a Captain too. Once or twice there were meetings arranged with the representative of the Ukrainian Embassy in France.

I'll remind briefly of Capt. Ilnitsky's history told by him during that meeting on the 28th of May. His vessel "MC RUBY" flying the Bahamas Flag was sailing from Africa to Europe. The port of departure, probably, was Douala, Cameroon. It was the 6th day of their voyage just before calling to the port of Le Havre, France, when he found out from his Chief Mate, whom he had promoted from the 4th up to the Chief Officer position, that there were footsteps noticed on the deck. That could mean that there were strangers aboard the vessel. The Captain ordered to search the vessel thoroughly and the Chief Officer in-

formed some time later that there were 9 stowaways found in the 4th hold. These passengers, probably trying to get some food to eat, opened the cargo containers as well as packages with cacao and coffee. They allegedly demanded from the Chief Officer some products and water and refused his offer to work on the deck. They are likely to appear on the deck because of being thirsty and hungry and it was these steps discovered by the crewmembers that unlucky morning. The Chief Officer remembered a similar case with stowaways aboard the same vessel but when it was manned by the other crew during one of the previous voyages. Then it led to imposing a fine amounting to US\$120,000.00 on the company, the owner of the vessel. So he offered to the Captain to throw the stowaways overboard. But the Captain's answer was as follows: "**No piracy aboard the vessel.** As soon as we arrive at the port we'll settle the problem".

The Captain couldn't even suppose all the consequences of the Chief Officer's proposal seemed to be unreal for him then. He prepared the cable to the shipowner, operator and the vessel's agent where he informed of the discovered stowaways and asked for additional instructions. The Chief Officer, in his turn, asked him not to be in a hurry to send a radiogram to these addresses. He supported his request by the following argument: "Weekend is coming and everybody is having a rest. That's why it's better to do it just after the weekend." The Captain didn't discuss this proposal with him. However, he put the radiogram away at the edge of the table for a while. Now he regrets for his indecisiveness in this important moment which became fateful from his point of view. If he had performed his intention then the events of that night between Monday and Tuesday would never have happened.

That is what happened that night. The Chief Officer invited two sailors and a messman and told them that they were

supposed to do something very important to avoid problems at the next port of call. They had to throw the stowaways overboard. The proposal to kill the stowaways is likely to arise during this talk or, to be exactly, those talks (as they certainly didn't discuss it once). They were going to throw their bodies overboard. One of the seafarers had a rifle which he purchased or exchanged for some domestic appliances former used in one of African ports. Later, it was found that aboard the vessel the group had also two pistols, however they used the rifle to realize their plans.

About 1 p.m. the Chief Officer began to release the stowaways from the forecastle. They were placed there to avoid damage of the cargo. Accompanied by the two seafarers, two persons per each time were directed into the deck room of the hold #2 where the sailor equipped with the rifle was waiting for them. After the stowaways crossed the threshold of the deck room of hold #2 he first shot point-blank at the one who was behind and then, having pulled aside the breech-block, he fired at the second one who was in front. The seafarers threw the bodies overboard and went for the next pair. In such a way they killed eight men with sang-froid but the ninth one turned out to be lucky - the breech-block jammed. It is possible to imagine the feeling of that young man who saw the death of his brother and was in the face of death himself. He turned sharply and rushed away. The sailors were slow and managed to strike a blow with iron on his head but failed to injure him seriously. He had only a bruise and a wound to show after this blow. And nevertheless good luck took his side that night as the further search for the fugitive didn't bring any success. Still nobody knows exactly where he took refuge. Now many years later the Captain turns again to the events of that nightmare and guesses that he took cover in the basin under a heap of rubbish: tarpaulin, ropes and others.

The Chief Officer informed the Captain of the night's events and the Captain regretted that he hadn't sent the radiogram. He understood that he had made the unforgivable mistake of following the Chief Officer's advice. But it was impossible to do anything and he let things slide having become a hostage of the circumstances.

They arrived at Le Havre in one and a half days, unloaded the cargo and were ready for departure. But the event noticed by nobody took place in Le Havre. The fugitive managed to leave his hiding place unnoticed and jumped over the ship's side onto the pier. He was lucky because it was the morning low water. So the ship's side and the pier were almost on the same level and there was no risk for him to be injured. When the stowaway-fugitive went ashore, first of all he addressed the police and further events went on in correspondence with very plain scenario. In the afternoon the police came aboard the vessel instead of the pilot. The alive stowaway accompanied them. He identified all the participants of that bloody night. Certainly, there was no Captain among them. He was arrested later for participation in the murder. The Chief Officer made him a participant. He allegedly heard from the Captain in response to his information about the stowaway aboard the vessel the following words: **"No stowaways aboard the vessel"**. So he ostensibly understood it as the order and this phrase untied his hands in the choice of means in his actions. As for the Captain he assured that he answered in response to the Chief Officer's proposal: **"No piracy aboard the vessel"**.

The Captain and the Chief Officer were sentenced by the French Court to imprisonment for life. The other participants of this drama were sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The victim's relatives brought a claim to the Court for each of the convicts which amounted to 500,000.00 Francs. Captain Ilnitsky's share of this claim was paid with the help

of a French woman who knew Russian and taught Ilnitsky French when his prison was not so far from her home. The present prison is his third one and is considered to be a prison with a severe regime. Captain Ilnitsky doesn't complain of the regime, maintenance and a way of life. He has a single accurate prison cell with a sanitary unit as 300 other prisoners here have. He has an opportunity to play tennis, volleyball, basketball and football. The equipped gym is available for him as well. Ilnitsky has 1,300.00 Francs which remained after the deductions. So he can buy fresh fruit and vegetables and make a call to Odessa once a week. There is a TV set, a fridge, some text books for training his language skills, Russian books. The French woman brought him earlier enough of them.

And nevertheless native language communication is the thing he is lacking most of all. It's this circumstance that made him make the request to French Femida again asking to transfer him to the Ukraine. However he came to a clear understanding that he'll meet his death in a French prison. Captain Ilnitsky clearly understands that the Ukrainian prisons are worse than French ones but the impossibility to speak the native language seems for him a greater evil than some possible inconveniences. It's very difficult from the psychological point to realize that you'll never see your relatives, your Motherland, your native land again.

Captain Ilnitsky is thankful for IFSMA's support. He didn't have any personal requests. The only thing he took the liberty to ask for was his transference to Ukraine. I think that IFSMA and National Association of the Captains, Ukrainian and Russian, for example, could petition the French Ministry of Justice for the Captain Ilnitsky's transference to Ukrainian prison to serve his imprisonment for life. We, the Captains, don't decline the responsibility which is taken by each Captain

while entering this position. But we take into the account that Captain Ilnitsky isn't such a criminal in that sense of the word which is applicable to the Chief Officer's actions. Such an appeal from IFSMA to the president of France would be a great act of humanity and won't be contrary to the purposes and tasks of our international society.

Capt. Petr Osichansky,

**President of FESMA, Vladivostok,
Russia**

ILO Framework Convention

In January 2001, the ILO Joint Maritime Commission recommended the development of a comprehensive new 'framework' convention which will consolidate and update the wide range of existing international maritime employment regulations into a single, simpler instrument.

This subject was brought to the attention of the IFSMA 27th Annual General Assembly, by Captain Koichi Akatsuka, JCA, who agreed to provide reports of progress made.

ILO Maritime Labour Standards

Since ILO was established in 1919, more than 180 Conventions and 191 Recommendations covering international labour standards have been adopted, of which more than 30 Conventions and 20 Recommendations apply exclusively to merchant shipping.

The most important ILO maritime instrument is the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention 1976 No.147, which has been ratified by 41 countries and is the only ILO instrument adopted by most regional authorities for the purpose of port state control inspection. ILO 147 specifies that countries ratifying the Convention should have national laws or

regulations dealing with safety standards, social security measures and conditions of employment, where these are not adequately covered by collective agreements. The standards to be applied are those specified in a list of ILO instruments attached as an Appendix to the Convention.

Problems with existing ILO instruments

1. Many ILO standards are out of date and reflect concerns which no longer apply or deal with issues which are no longer relevant.

2. Several of the Conventions include an excessive amount of technical detail which discourages widespread ratification.

3. There are no amendments procedures specified in any of the instruments, so the only way to update them is to adopt a revised instrument and withdraw the old version. This is a time-consuming process involving adoption of a revised instrument by a full Maritime Conference at intervals of around ten years.

4. The record of ratification of ILO maritime instrument has been particularly poor in recent years. Administrations are suffering from 'regulation overload' and are unlikely to be prepared to consider ratification of detailed instruments dealing with what are perceived to be relatively minor technical issues.

5. ILO standards are more difficult to enforce than IMO standards because the wording is less prescriptive and ships are not required to carry evidence of compliance issued by the flag state.

6. The major ILO maritime instrument, ILO 147, is itself less than perfect and will become increasingly out of date. Already one of the Conventions listed in the Appendix to ILO 147 has been revised, and most of the other Conventions have been listed for revision. However, as the Appendix refers to the Convention by name and number, and there is no procedure for re-

vision of ILO 147, the standards set by an old Convention will remain in effect for the purposes of ILO 147 even if for all other purposes the Convention is withdrawn.

What is the solution?

The cycle of ILO maritime activity begins with a meeting of the Joint Maritime Commission (JMC), which determines the priorities for standard setting, and ends with a Maritime Conference to adopt new or revised ILO instruments.

At the ISF Council meeting in Rotterdam in 1999 the Council gave approval to the ISF Labour Affairs Committee to explore novel approaches to ILO standard-setting activities in order to overcome the problems listed above. Following several informal meetings with ILO and ITF officials during 1999, the Council meeting in Manila in 2000 endorsed the recommendations of the Committee as to the policy which should be adopted. This policy was that:

1. The overall objective should be to consolidate as many as possible of the existing ILO Conventions and Recommendations within one new instrument.

2. The new instrument should provide for general principles covering key labour standards to be incorporated within the main body of the Convention, with detailed requirements incorporated in Annexes to the Convention. This would allow for the Annexes to be amended and kept up to date more easily.

3. It would be necessary, and desirable, to update the provisions of a number of existing instruments during the course of the process of consolidation, while avoiding the creation of new standards or additional obligations beyond this applied within the existing body of instruments.

4. the new instrument should embrace sufficient flexibility to encourage wide-

spread ratification, and should also ensure that the standards can be enforced effectively through flag and port state inspection.

5. A new approach to the above development of the test of the new instrument was necessary to ensure that all parties were involved at an early stage and that obligations were accepted by consensus and not imposed on one party by the combined votes of the other two parties.

These principles were accepted by the seafarer representatives at the JMC meeting in January 2001 and form the basis for the ILO work programme in the maritime sector which has been agreed by the ILO Governing Body.

What is the timetable for the Work?

A High Level Tripartite Working Group has been appointed to develop the text for the new instrument. The Group comprises 12 government representatives appointed by the ILO Governing Body, with 12 shipowners' representatives and 12 seafarers' representatives appointed by the respective groups in the JMC. The High Level group will meet once a year for the next three years, starting in December 2001. The views of the shipowner representatives will be co-ordinated by ISF.

In addition, a Sub-Group comprising four representatives of each group has also been appointed. The Sub-group will meet as required and will prepare papers and develop proposals as requested by the High Level Group.

A preparatory meeting to consider the draft text of the new instrument will be held in 2004, and a full Maritime Conference will be arranged to adopt the instrument in 2005.

Will the outcome be successful?

ISF Members have concluded that ineffective and outdated international labour standards are not in the best interest of

the international shipping industry. The objective of creating a new flagship maritime instrument covering key labour and social standards which is widely accepted, up to date and properly enforced by flag and port state inspection authorities is an ambitious target, but the potential reward fully justifies the risk.

(With acknowledgement to the International Shipping Federation).

In Defense of the ISM

An article by Captain Suresh Bhardwaj, Individual Member, India. May 2001.

Sir,

What plagues ISM is not the elements of SMS itself, but the lack of proper understanding of its intent, objectives, implementation, methodology and even auditing methodology.

In the bargain myths are created and wrong practices are perpetuated and then the Code is blamed for its ineffectiveness.

I have been fortunate enough to have seen other sectors of industries closely where I have been implementing other similar systems of management like QMS and EMS and in the light of this experience I wish to strongly put forth the following defence for ISM.

1. A path breaking regulation – how?

- a) A **regulation** that for the first ever time looks at and regulates what is happening ashore, inside the office, otherwise, anything to do with safety and the environment it was the ship.
- b) A **regulation** that embodies such softer issues like attitudes and motivations in its structure. I have personally dealt with the Nuclear Power Sector with ISO 14001 and to control its radiation risks they have a

number of regulations, but nothing that is like this; matter of fact, let alone attitudes and motivations, even a management system as **regulation** is not there; and the concept of EMS 14001 appealed to them so much that they just took it up so very gladly. Yes, they have competency requirements, very much like our STCW, well in place.

2. Too much documentation – a myth.

The requirement for **documenting** a procedure is not at all called for in ISM. As compared to the ISO 9000:1994 standard which calls for documented procedures at all its clauses, the ISM **does not** do this. The word ‘document’ does appear in the clauses of ISM but very sparingly. Clause 7, which addresses vessels plans **does not** require a “documented” procedure. Just imagine a situation where you walk into a hospital and you find a nurse with a syringe in one hand and a documented work instruction in other hand. Would one feel comfortable?

Yes, the challenge was auditing procedures that were not documented and the auditors found an easy way to ask the companies to document procedures and the companies without challenging such request, complied with it, in the fear of non-compliance, because ISM is made a mandatory **regulation**; Unlike other systems of management that are only voluntary and meant to be so. But, in the shipping industry, I guess there was no choice but to make it mandatory. As the vessel operators would not take it up if it were left as a “**Guideline**” only.

Continuing on the issue of documentation, yes, documentation has got its own advantages but, the amount of documentation needs to be left to the company to specify. Records need to be there but not a “**documented**” procedure! The 2000 version of ISO 9000

too has removed this “documented procedure” requirement and now focuses on “processes”, ISO 14000 had the least “documented” requirements; ISM too has a similar approach, unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, it is the implementation and auditors of the ISM that have perpetuated this “documented” focus, who need to change their approach.

3. Three years and it has not delivered

A wrong expectation in the first place. ISM, is basically a system of management, that is based on the famous P-D-C-A cycle of Dr. Edward Demming, like all other management systems. QMS, EMS, OHSAS, SA8000, HACCP, QS 9000, AS 9000, SEI-CMM, etc.

The certification to ISM, merely establishes the fact that a management system is now established, and that is it.

That the system will and must improve, but over a period of time, is a fact mostly forgotten. And when a **system** improves, the **outcome** as a function of safety performance definitely improves.

Here, a great amount of responsibility rests on the shoulders of the auditors of the system, who, rather than being “policemen” wearing a “Compliance” hat, pitch themselves at a position in the system to add value and wear a “conformance” hat and help direct the system to continual improvement.

Three years in my view is not enough time to drive us to conclusions. More over IFSMA Newsletter #30 does report the Swedish P & I Club analysis that Insurance Claims have much reduced since ISM was implemented.

ISM indeed is a powerful system and an excellent tool and it is the practitioners’ skills in using this tool effec-

tively that is of consequence, not the Code itself.

4. ISM – why another regulation?

Well, as we all know, efforts for controlling the operations of vessels and bringing about a safety focus in the management of vessel operations has been there since 1982, first from ISF, then as guidelines from IMO and then the now infamous ISMA Code which resulted in a Cartel for shipmanagement business.

Shipping as a business is international in nature and while responsible ship-owners always existed, it is the large number of, shall we say “cost sensitive” operators globally existing who are short sighted in as much as not realising that a safety focus actually means good business sense, would do just the bare minimum driven by a ‘**regulation**’ culture. Well, if that is what drives you, then so be it and that is why we have an additional clause in ISM, Clause no.13, where this safety management system is required to be audited and certified by The Flag State Administration.

This requirement of external certification in the body of the management system is not there in other management systems, which is totally voluntary as it defeats the whole purpose of building a culture in the organization by bringing specific focuses on issues like Environment, Quality, Health and integration with normal operations. As a matter of fact the other management systems focus and look at establishing a **system** of compliance to regulation and **not the compliance itself** – 2 different issues, these are:

By making a management system like SMS through the ISM Code a regulation, the great danger is that, it gets to be looked at by its practitioners as just

another regulation to be ‘**SOMEHOW**’ complied with, and the spirit behind it becomes lost.

It is really for the Flag State Administration auditors to perceive this point of view in its right spirit, shed their “compliance hat” (which is so very difficult for them!) when **auditing (not surveying!)** ISM. They need to, as stressed earlier, help build this safety culture and commitment through a proper implementation of this wonderful safety management system and not be a policeman. They must realize that willy-nilly they perpetuate practices in the industry, and hence they need to rise above board and make ISM a success.

5. Specific issues like – fatigue, safe manning, how to motivate, are not addressed in ISM. – an escapist view.

SMS as per ISM is intended to be generic in nature and needs to be adapted to specific situations. The system has many powerful elements that can be interpreted to address the above issues, and many more; as a matter of fact the objective in the Preamble states to Establish Safeguards against all identifiable risks” – such a profound proactive statement, takes the industry much beyond the reactive focus of regulation compliance attitudes.

Yes, if the flag state administration itself becomes lax, then I suppose there is the Port State Control and ultimately the White List whip of the IMO that will work.

6. ISM an alien system – a wrong starting point.

The shipmaster who does not take up the ownership of the SMS, and keeps criticizing the system and the office, actually starts off on a very wrong foot.

He must remember, that he is an integral part of the complete SMS, take up its ownership, accept that there may be flaws in the system, strive to improve it, point out the shortcomings and do something about it. The intent of the SMS is just that, continual improvement of the SMS. They must first believe in the system, and mere criticism will do no good. In fact, the office ashore want such inputs and if it is otherwise, where the office does not take cognisance of these inputs, then the Flag State Administration's audit will at some point reveal this attitude and the office will then have to do a lot of explaining.

So, the first step is to be a part of the system, take full ownership and work towards its improvement.

ISM has to deliver and will deliver, provided it is implemented properly and audited properly.

Safety Culture

Regulators, classification societies, the maritime press and IMO constantly refer to the need for ship operators to practise a safety culture. But what precisely do they mean?

Everyone agrees with the objectives of a safety culture – the reduction and elimination of accidents which involve injuries to ships' personnel and damage to property and the environment – but there can be some confusion as to what a safety culture really represents.

Experts commonly describe it as the values and practices that management and personnel share to ensure that risks are minimised and mitigated to the greatest degree possible. In short, this means that safety is always the first priority.

With a true safety culture, every crewmember – whether a rating or a Master – thinks about safety, and new ways of improving it, as a matter of course.

The cause of practically every unsafe incident can be traced to some form of human or organisational error. If people think about safety continuously, many accidents simply will not happen because virtually all so called "accidents" are in fact preventable.

The development of a safety culture does not lend itself to prescriptive rules, and the purpose of this article is simply to encourage readers to consider how even more might be done to improve levels of maritime safety.

Although experts on the subject may talk in terms of psychology or behavioural change, the key to achieving a safety culture is:

- **Recognising that all "accidents" are preventable and normally only occur following unsafe actions or a failure to follow correct procedures;**
- **Constantly thinking safety; and**
- **Always setting targets for continuous improvement.**

How can a Safety Culture Save Money?

In addition to ethical and social responsibilities, shipping companies practice a safety culture because:

- **Senior managers that cannot manage safety will be unlikely to manage a profitable shipping company;**
- **A dedicated approach to safety is a cost saving not a cost; and**
- **Safety culture provides a means of maximising the benefits and cost**

savings that can be derived from implementing the ISM Code.

IMO Secretary-General's Contract Renewed For A Further Two Years

IMO Secretary-General William O'Neil, Honorary Member of IFSMA, is to continue to serve the Organization until the end of 2003 following the decision by the IMO Council on 19th June to approve a two-year extension to his contract.

Addressing the Council meeting, Mr O'Neil said "I would like to thank the Council members for honouring me with the renewal of my contract for another two years and I am very pleased to be able to continue to serve the Organization. I also thank the staff of the Secretariat for the assistance and support given to me since my initial appointment in 1990."

Looking ahead to what will be a period in which significant long-term efforts to improve maritime safety and reduce the risk of pollution will take effect, Mr O'Neil said, "The next two years are important for the Organization and I look forward to putting in place measures that will ensure world shipping has the best possible service. By dealing with issues at IMO and providing the leadership the world is looking for we will be able to maintain IMO's position in the shipping sector, and to enhance it."

Among the major landmarks for IMO and world shipping during the next two years will be the final implementation date of the revised STCW Convention, which is concerned with the training and certification of seafarers, and the extension of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code to all cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and above. These two measures form the cornerstone of IMO's drive to focus on the human element in shipping during the 21st Century. Other key initiatives expected to produce significant results during the remainder of Mr O'Neil's term in

office include large-scale reviews of the safety of passenger ships and bulk carriers, in both of which Mr O'Neil has undertaken a strong personal role.

Mr O'Neil added, "There are a number of things the organization is engaged in right now which I would like to see through and together we can ensure that the fundamental objectives of the Organization can be pursued."

Referring to the projected enlargement of the IMO Council from 32 to 40 members, Mr O'Neil said, "It is important to have representation on the Council from all parts of the world and I look forward to the 1993 amendments to the IMO Convention being put in place. I therefore place stress on fulfilling the requirements for their entry into force."

The extension to Mr O'Neil's contract is expected to be formally approved by the IMO Assembly when it meets in November this year.

Background

Mr. William A O'Neil of Canada became the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization, The United Nations agency concerned with maritime safety and prevention of marine pollution from ships, on 1 January 1990. He succeeded India's Mr C. P. Srivastava, who had served in the post for the previous sixteen years.

Mr O'Neil has been associated with IMO since 1972, when he attended the IMO Council as Canada's representative. The Council serves as IMO's governing body between biennial sessions of the Assembly and consists of 32 Member States elected by the Assembly. In 1979 Mr O'Neil was elected Chairman of the Council and held the post until his appointment by the Council to serve his first four-year terms as Secretary-General.

Mr O'Neil came to IMO from the Canadian St Lawrence Seaway Authority, where he had been President and Chief Executive Officer since 1980. After graduating from the University of Toronto he joined Canada's Federal Department of Transport. In 1955 he became Division Engineer in charge of bringing the Welland Canal up to St Lawrence Seaway standards and subsequently held other senior posts with the authority, including being in charge of the Welland Canal. In 1964 he became responsible for all Seaway construction and major maintenance work. In 1971 Mr O'Neil became Deputy Administrator, Marine Services, of the Canadian Marine Transport Administration and four years later became first Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard. In addition, he was a Director of Canarctic Shipping Ltd and Director of several intraprovincial and international bridge corporations. Mr O'Neil is also Chancellor of the World Maritime University and Chairman of the Governing Board of the IMO International Maritime Law Institute.

Mr O'Neil was unanimously re-elected to serve a second four-year term as Secretary-General beginning in 1994 and was again re-elected for a third four year term beginning in 1998.

During his term of office Mr O'Neil has encouraged IMO to take a more pro-active role in promoting maritime safety and combating marine pollution. He has been closely associated with efforts to focus attention on the safety of bulk carriers, ro-ro ferry safety and the importance of the human element.

Previous IMO Secretary-Generals

Ove Nielsen (Denmark)	1959-1961
William Graham (United Kingdom, Acting)	1961-1963
Jean Roullier (France)	1964-1967

Colin Goad (United Kingdom)	1968-1973
Chandrika Prasad Srivastava (India)	1974-1989

The Parrot

Mary received a parrot as a gift . The parrot was fully grown with a very bad attitude and worse vocabulary. Every other word was an expletive: those that weren't expletives were to say the least, rude. Mary tried to change the bird's attitude by constantly saying polite Words and playing soft music...anything she could think of.

Nothing worked.

She yelled at the bird and the bird got worse. She shook the bird and The bird got madder and more rude. Finally in a moment of desperation, Mary put the parrot in the freezer to get a minute of peace. For a few moments she heard the bird swearing, squawking kicking and screaming and then, suddenly there was absolute quiet.

Mary was frightened that she might have actually hurt the bird and quickly opened the freezer door. The parrot calmly stepped out onto Mary's extended arm and said "I'm very sorry that I offended you with my language and my actions and I ask your forgiveness. I will endeavour to correct my behaviour and I am sure it will never happen again".

Mary was astounded at the changes in the bird's attitude and was about to ask what had changed him, when the parrot continued, "May I ask what the chicken did?"

Reporting Near Misses

1. The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-fourth session (30 May to 8 June 2001), considered the issue of reporting near misses and how to promote a no-blame culture.
2. The Committee noted the necessity of encouraging reporting of near misses, so that remedial measures can be taken to avoid recurrences.
3. In order to promote a no-blame culture, Member Governments are invited to:
 - .1 review their regulatory and safety regime with a view to encouraging the reporting of near misses without fear of reprisals or punitive action;
 - .2 urge companies operating ships under their flag not to penalise persons reporting near misses; and
 - .3 urge companies operating ships under their flag to implement procedures by which persons should only report near misses to the designated person or persons and the designated person or persons should only pass on such reports in an anonymous form.

MSC/Circ. 1015 dated 12 June 2001

The Mariners Guide to Marine Communications

By Ian Waugh, Published by The Nautical Institute.

Deck Officers at sea now have responsibilities for maritime communications and it was therefore felt appropriate for The Nautical Institute to provide a comprehensive guide which can be used for training and as a source of reference on board.

In his foreword to the book Mr. William O'Neil, Secretary General of IMO states

“This new publication is most timely – The Mariner’s Guide to Maritime Communication provides a handy reference on board which will improve communications, discipline and help to prevent operator errors and reduce false alerts.”

Captain Martin Scott, President of The Nautical Institute said whilst launching the new book at the IMO on 27th June 2001:

“There is a wide-spread misconception that satellites have turned communications with ships at sea into an operation as simple as picking up a mobile telephone. The reality is different. First routine traffic is extremely costly and so we only use sat com when we have to. Admittedly it is easier than Morse telegraphy, but against that the deck department had a full time job before we were asked to take over the emergency safety watch.

Communications equipment is sophisticated, most sets have self-tuning and frequency recognition, but there are many different types of equipment and as pointed out so well in Mr. Waugh’s book, you really do need a good understanding of the subject if you are not to accidentally trigger a false alert.”

A copy of this excellent publication is available for inspection at IFSMA Headquarters (visitors by appointment only please), we also include a brochure for this new Guide with this Newsletter. Once again we are delighted to announce that IFSMA Members have been offered a considerable discount at £25-20 per copy plus postage – see brochure, when ordering **YOU MUST** mention that you are an IFSMA Member to receive the discount, otherwise you will be charged the full price. Please note, the **bulk order** price is available to all regardless of membership.

If you are driving at the speed of light and you turn your headlights on, what happens?

Captain Rodger MacDonald FNI, Secretary General Designate

The Secretary General is pleased to introduce to you Captain Rodger MacDonald the Secretary General Designate, who was interviewed by the President and Executive Council on 2nd March 2001 in London and is to be appointed with effect from 1st August this year. It is intended that he should assume full responsibility as Secretary General from the date of the November Executive Council Meeting.

Brief particulars concerning Captain Rodger MacDonald are appended here under together with photograph on page 32.

Captain Rodger M. MACDONALD. Age 60. Married. Lives at Fleet, Hampshire.

Cadet to Chief Officer with British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd 1958-1966

Master's F/G Certificate - Flight Planner with Air New Zealand 1966-1967

Surveyor of Ships for New Zealand Government - based in Lyttleton 1967-1970

Port Safety Officer and Examiner for Home Trade Certificates & Other Seafarer Qualifications

Marine Co-ordinator for Search & Rescue (Christchurch) and for Civil Defence (South Island)

Ship Commands Cargo Guan Guan Shipping & Passenger/Cargo Straits Steamship 1970-1971

General Manager in Brunei New Company - Borneo Straits Offshore (B) Ltd 1971-1976

Head of Marketing based London - Ocean Inchcape Ltd (later renamed OIL Ltd) 1976-1987

General Manager Middle East - Oil Terminal Projects in Yemen - OIL Ltd 1987-1990

Regional General Manager Far East Middle East SEAsia - OIL Ltd (Ocean Group) 1990-1995

Specialist Project Manager UK - Two Specialist Tasks for OIL Ltd (Ocean Group) 1995-1996

Then took early Retirement to pursue a Career in Maritime Education after 26 years with Ocean

Director of Faculty National Sea Training Centre, North West Kent College 1996-2001

Retiring at his own request in July having successfully achieved his targets

Licensed Compass Adjuster (Voluntary Examination in Compass Deviation) Auckland 1966

Currently Studying for MSc by Distance Learning through Middlesex University.

Attended General Management Development Course at Sundridge Park Mgmt Centre 1990

A Fellow and Council Member of the Nautical Institute (FNI)

Hon. Secretary of the London Branch and Member of Council Education & Training Committee

Member of the Honourable Company of Master Mariners and Master of an Apprentice

Director of Azimuth Marine Ltd - small Company specialising in providing tutorial support to students on marine related open or distance learning courses.

Working relationship with Informa IBC Ltd offering technical advice in developing distance learning and a virtual campus

Author of several recent Conference Papers on the Training of Mariners & Distance Learning

Expression of Interest dated 08 February 2001.



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**Captain Rodger MacDonald FNI,
Secretary General Designate**



**Captain Christer Lindvall
President, with Captain
Gerhard Goldberg in Lubeck**

During the IFSMA 27th Annual General Assembly in Lubeck, Germany, we were delighted to have the company of Captain Gerhard Goldberg, Past President of both IFSMA and VDKS and Honorary IFSMA Member.

IFSMA Reaffirms its Undertakings to IMO

In a letter to the Secretary General of IMO dated 9 July The Secretary General of IFSMA wrote:

Dear Mr O'Neil

Non -Governmental International Organizations in Consultative Status with IMO

Rule 4: General Undertaking by the Non - Governmental Organization

Response to the Request of Council D / 86, Decision 22 (b).8 :

I write in response to your Circular Letter No.2320 dated 28 June2001concerning the Council's request that all Non - Governmental Organizations should be reminded of the importance of their complying with their undertakings to the Organization under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Relationship with Non - Governmental International Organizations and should reaffirm these undertakings.

"Rule 4: General undertaking by the non - governmental organization

Consultative status may not be granted to a non - governmental international organization unless it undertakes to support the activities of the International Maritime Organization and to promote the dissemination of its principles and work, bearing in mind the objectives and functions of the International Maritime Organization on the one hand, and the competence and activities of the non - governmental organization on the other ."

The International Federation of Shipmasters' Associations (IFSMA) is pleased, and indeed welcomes the opportunity, to reaffirm its undertakings under Rule 4. It has become our customary practice with each World Maritime Day Letter to renew our pledge of full support to the Secretary General of IMO in his ceaseless efforts to improve Maritime Safety and to protect the Marine Environment, and this we shall continue to do on a regular yearly basis.

We trust this reaffirmation by the Secretary General of IFSMA, which is given on behalf of the President, the Executive Council, the Affiliated Associations and the Individual Members worldwide will suffice to satisfy the IMO Council at its 21st Extraordinary Session that IFSMA really is unwaveringly dedicated to, and fully supportive of, the aims and objectives of IMO.

Yours respectfully

Captain Roger Clipsham.
Secretary General (IFSMA)